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The intense contemporary criticism of the United States
Supreme Court is analyzed in the following article with
an attempt to determine its justification.
ATTACKS ON
THE SUPREME COURT*
JOHN E. DUNSFORDt AND RICHARD J. CHILDRESSt
ACORDING TO AN old dictum, it makes a difference whose ox is being
gored. In the past few years the Supreme Court has gored some
oxen (plus, now and then, a sacred cow), and the proof of the proverb
lies in the sustained attack which has been mounted. The common judg-
ment is that contemporary criticism of the Court has few parallels for
scope and intensity in American history.
Disparagement of court decisions is not a new phenomenon, of course.
Criticism of the high Court has flashed like summer lightning through
the nation's history, and one ordinarily need go no further than his favor-
ite historical character to find some juicy tidbit of invective. Indeed, a
case might be made against the present expressions of pique solely on the
grounds of their pedestrian tenor.
Senator William E. Jenner has characterized the Court's work as lack-
ing "solid foundation in either legal principles or common sense." Pro-
fessor Edward S. Corwin has suggested that the justices "bone up a little
on the history of the Constitution before trying to remake it." Journalistic
pundits have alternatively explained their disagreement with the Court's
opinions by claiming that the justices are sadly deficient in scholarship,
or haven't had sufficient lower court experience to function properly on
the high bench.
The unique status of the Court makes it a scapegoat for any group in
our society. Unlike politicians, the Supreme Court cannot be all things
to all people. The nature of the institution impels judgment and decision
- the deliberate choice between competing claims and theories. And what
pleases the Civil Liberties Union is apt to wrap a fog of gloomy debate
around the next American Legion convention.
*Reprinted, with permission, from the December 1957 issue of THE SOCIAL ORDER.
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A focal point of modern tensions, the
Court is vulnerable to attack from all sides.
In the important policy questions which the
Court must decide substantial group inter-
est can be identified with both sides - the
losing as well as the winning side. The Con-
stitution is very often invoked to protect the
rights claimed by the minority or the un-
popular side of public issues. It is, thus,
inevitable that the Court will decide against
some powerful and vocal groups. Just a
glance at some of the recent decisions which
feed the contemporary controversies is suf-
ficient to show the type of problem with
which the Court is confronted, and the
variety of social groups which it has an-
tagonized.
Cases Reviewed
Segregationists and state rights groups
are still smarting from the 1954 opinion of
the Supreme Court in Brown v. Board of
Education1 which held the racial segrega-
tion of students in public schools to be a
violation of the equal protection clause of
the fourteenth amendment. Some of the at-
tacks were of the emotional sort, including
the perennial question, "Would you like
your sister to marry a Negro?" Others
reached for the cloak of constitutional re-
spectability with claims that the fourteenth
amendment had never been properly rati-
fied, that the Court failed to follow its own
prior decisions by rejecting the "separate
but equal" doctrine, and that the Court had
used "sociological" rather than legal cri-
teria to determine the meaning of "equal
protection of the laws."
Perhaps the most publicized decision of
the past term of the Court was the case of
Jencks v. United States.2 Both law enforce-
1347 U.S. 483 (1954).
2 353 U.S. 657 (1957).
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ment officers and other citizens, pre-
occupied with security against subversion,
protested the high Court's ruling that in a
federal criminal trial, after a prosecution
witness has testified, the defendant is en-
titled to inspect the witness' prior state-
ments which were made to government
agents and are in the government files and
which touch the events and activities on
which he has testified. The purpose of this
inspection is to give the defendant the
benefit of information which might show
that the witness has told inconsistent sto-
ries. It would seem only fair the accused
be enabled to impeach the reliability of an
inconsistent government witness. Certainly,
the defendant could not readily do so if the
prior statements on the same subject mat-
ter are locked in the prosecution files. It is
particularly worthy of note that the probity
of the rule was demonstrated in the Jencks
case itself where one of the witnesses, Har-
vey F. Matusow, subsequently recanted his
testimony under oath. It should be noted
too that the extent to which the govern-
ment files had to be exposed was limited to
statements touching the subject matter on
which testimony had already been given.
The Federal Bureau of Investigation may
like to protect its files, but a limited use of
them is often proper if a person charged
with crime is to be able to get information
necessary for his defense. Some lower fed-
eral courts had already required such a
practice. A few months after the Jencks
case Congress passed an act which left the
decision substantially intact as a federal
procedural rule.
Some legislators and other citizens with
a deep-seated conviction that the Court and
the nation are soft on communism were
irate over the Court's holding in Watkins v.
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United States3 which limited the investiga-
tive powers of Congressional committees.
The decision reversed a conviction for con-
tempt of Congress based on the defendant's
refusal to answer some of the questions
posed by the House of Representatives'
Committee on Un-American Activities. The
Court traced the history of legislative in-
vestigations from the English Parliament
through to recent congressional hearings
and found a new tendency in the investiga-
tions which "involved a broad-scale intru-
sion into the lives and affairs of private
citizens." 4 The constitutional infirmity in
the conviction of Watkins, the Court found,
was rooted in the vagueness and the sweep-
ing character of the House resolution creat-
ing the Committee; this made it impossible
for the witness to know the extent of the
Committee's authority to command his
cooperation in answering the questions
propounded. The Court reasoned that
Congress has no power to expose for the
sake of exposure:
The theory of a committee inquiry is that
the committee members are serving as the
representatives of the parent assembly in
collecting information for legislative pur-
pose .... An essential premise in this situa-
tion is that the House or Senate shall have
instructed the committee members on what
they are to do with the power delegated to
them.... Those instructions are embodied
in the authorizing resolution. 5
The Court after investigating the resolution
creating the Committee on Un-American
Activities found: "No one could reasonably
deduce from the charter the kind of investi-
gation that the Committee was directed to
make."6 The Court concluded:
3 354 U.S. 178 (1957).
4Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S. 178, 195
(1957).
5 Id. at 200-0 1.
6 Id. at 204.
Petitioner was thus not accorded a fair
opportunity to determine whether he was
within hisrights in refusing to answer, and
his conviction is necessarily invalid under
the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amend-
ment.
7
The Court also stated that Congress in its
investigations must not encroach unreason-
ably upon the individual's privacy or upon
his liberty of speech, press, religion or as-
sembly.
Groups preoccupied with security against
the menace of communist subversion were
once more disturbed at the Supreme Court's
reversal of the conviction of fourteen West
Coast communists for conspiracy to violate
the Smith Act. The decision in Yates v.
United States8 defined the statutory term
"organize" to include only initial organiza-
tion. As a result parts of several indict-
ments were declared invalid as covering
acts beyond the three-year statute of limita-
tions. By this holding the Court rejected the
government's interpretation of the Smith
Act and applied the familiar rule of law
that criminal statutes are to be construed
strictly. The Court also made a distinction
between teaching the violent overthrow of
the government as an abstract doctrine in
the academic sense and advocacy that in-
cites to illegal action. This distinction was
applied to the Smith Act which was inter-
preted to allow academic discussion of
communism while prohibiting incitement to
overthrow the government. The distinction
is not only a valid one but essential if the
truth of a philosophical or theological posi-
tion is not to be decided by legislative fiat.
The government which is competent to de-
clare Marxism false is able to say the same
of Thomism. This does not, however, pre-
7 Id. at 215.
8 354 U.S. 298 (1957).
vent the government from prohibiting
speech that incites illegal action, as the
Court had earlier held in Dennis v. United
States.9 This important distinction was for-
gotten by alarmist critics excited to dis-
cover that fourteen communists were not
yet jailed.
Some of the groups which are concerned
with civil liberties found cause for dissatis-
faction in the Court's handling of obscenity
in Roth v. United States.10 Occasional
blasts from the other side of the fence came
from those who agreed with the Court's
opinion that "obscenity is not within the
area of constitutionally protected speech or
press,"' 1 but who disagree with the standard
approved by the Court for defining obscen-
ity. The standard applied by the lower court
was "whether to the average person, apply-
ing contemporary community standards,
the dominant theme of the material taken
as a whole appeals to prurient interest.' 1 -2
While it is true that this might not be an
ethician's definition of obscenity, ethicians
do not make up the juries that have to rule
on the charges. Some of the groups devoted
to civil rights were also disturbed at Kings-
ley Books, Inc. v. Brown1" which allowed
an injunction against the sale of obscene
books. Here the objection was that prior re-
straint on the press violated freedom of
press guaranteed by the first amendment.
Justice Frankfurter's opinion attempted to
meet the objections against prior restraint
with this argument:
Instead of requiring the bookseller to
dread that the offer for sale of a book may,
without prior warning, subject him to a
9341 U.S. 494 (1951).
10 354 U.S. 476 (1957).
11 Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 485
(1957).
12 Id. at 489.
13 354 U.S. 436 (1957).
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criminal prosecution with the hazard of
imprisonment, the civil procedure assures
him that such consequences cannot follow
unless he ignores a court order specifically
directed to him .... 14
Veterans' organizations-as well as those
who in general distrust foreign justice -
were incensed at the action of the Court in
denying relief to an American soldier whom
the United States Army proposed to deliver
to the Japanese government to be tried for
the killing of a Japanese woman in Japan.' 5
The issue was complicated by the 1951 Se-
curity Treaty and an Administrative Agree-
ment with Japan. Under this Agreement a
joint committee of the two countries met
but was unable to decide which nation
should prosecute the soldier, Girard. The
Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of
State determined that the United States
would waive jurisdiction. It was the waiver
of jurisdiction which brought forth the
cries. In the Court's opinion the United
States could waive jurisdiction under an
article of the Agreement which provided:
The authorities of the State having the
primary right shall give sympathetic consid-
eration to a request from the authorities of
the other State for a waiver of its right in
cases where that other State considers such
waiver to be of particular importance. 16
The Court expressed its belief that "the
wisdom of the arrangement is exclusively
for the determination of the Executive and
Legislative Branches."'1 7 Here it is ironic
that the Court is criticized for not interfer-
ing with the action of Congress and the Ex-
ecutive, whereas the usual complaint is that
the Court is guilty of usurpation of the
powers of the coordinate branches.
14 Kingsley Books, Inc. v. Brown, 354 U.S. 436,
442 (1957).
15 Wilson v. Girard, 354 U.S. 524 (1957).
16 Id. at 529.
17 Id. at 530.
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A section of the business and industrial
community was dismayed at the Court's
finding in United States v. E. I. du Pont de
Nemours and Company's that Section 7 of
the Clayton Anti-Trust Act prohibited the
lessening of competition through the hold-
ing of stock in a customer corporation (i.e.,
prohibited "vertical" stock acquisition).
Section 7 of the Act makes it unlawful
to acquire ... the whole or any part of the
siock or other share capital of another cor-
poration... where the effect of such acquisi-
tion may be ... to restrain such commerce
in any section or community, or tend to
create a monopoly of any line of com-
merce. 19
The Act was adopted in 1914 and the
earlier applications of the section had been
made to prevent the lessening of competi-
tion through holding of stock in a compet-
ing corporation (i.e., to prohibit "horizontal"
stock acquisitions). The Federal Trade
Commission had not applied the section to
vertical stock acquisitions, and it is safe to
say that the section was generally thought
not to apply to such acquisitions. The Court
further held in the du Pont case that the
question of whether competition was less-
ened could be made at the time the govern-
ment filed the suit and did not have to be
made at the time of original acquisition.
The Court said the statute was applicable
"whenever the reasonable likelihood ap-
pears that the acquisition will result in a
restraint of commerce or in the creation of
a monopoly of any line of commerce." 20
It is hard to deny that the du Pont case ex-
pands the meaning of the Clayton Act, but
it must not be overlooked that the case
was brought at the instance of the Execu-
is 353 U.S. 586 (1957).
19 United States v. E. I. du Pont de Nemours
& Co., 353 U.S. 586, 589 (1957).
20 Id. at 592.
tive Branch of the government and that the
Congress can readily modify the Act if it
believes that the Court has erred.
Taking a broad view of the decisions
here noted, one is struck by the kind of
problem with which the Court is saddled.
These cases called for judgments on core
issues of our society: procedural rights of
the individual faced with the massed power
of the state; limits of free expression in a
pluralistic society; irreducible minimums of
minority interests; permissible affiliations of
economic blocs; propriety of method in
combatting subversion. These involuted
questions underlie the facts of the cases.
They call for specification and resolution,
not in the sweet-sounding phrases of the
speculative, but in the harsh irrevocable
words of decision.
At any given time the diverse principles
and overlapping assumptions which consti-
tute a functioning government are in a pre-
carious and shifting balance; this state of
affairs is more, not less, true in a democ-
racy. The task of the Supreme Court is
nothing less than the articulation of this
amorphous public philosophy and the ap-
plication of it to the controversies which
are properly brought before the bar.
Much of the present criticism can be
traced, then, to an ignorance of what the
judicial act entails, or to an unwillingness
to accept the system of government which
provides for a Supreme Court with power
of review.
The popular notion of law demands a
code of well-defined and finished rules
under which all imaginable problems fit
with snug exactness. Thus men who in their
daily lives suffer agonies of indecision over
which suit to buy expect that a Justice can
interpret the Clayton Act "correctly."
Those who conscientiously grapple with
large but individual problems of moral
conduct are chagrined when the Court can-
not produce some slide-rule to determine
the meaning of "obscene" for 170,000,000
of us.
The fact that lower courts are reversed
in their decisions is a scandal of a sort.
"Don't lower court judges know law, too?
How, indeed, can there be disagreement
over what the law is?" The supposition be-
hind the objection is obviously that courts
are invading the province of Congress, con-
trary to all the principles of government
which are summarized in the textbooks:
"the legislator makes the law, the executive
enforces it, and the judiciary determines
violations." Do we have a government of
law or of men, runs the complaint.
This view - which, incidentally, is not
necessarily restricted to those outside the
legal fraternity- assigns to the judge merely
the elementary task of applying law to facts
and transcribing the results. Whatever va-
lidity such a philosophy has for the routine
class of lawsuits, it fails miserably as an ex-
planation of the operation of a Supreme
Court. For the Supreme Court also has as a
primary function the interpreting of a writ-
ten Constitution, with the gloss that such
interpretation is authoritative.
Constitutions are not the same type of
animals as other laws. They are not de-
signed to detail the solutions of every prob-
lem that can arise. Instead, they set down
norms and guideposts within which particu-
lar decisions must be reached. All of this is
elementary.
Yet even when the Court is not exercis-
ing itself on a specific constitutional issue,
it is normally concerned with problems that
in their scope and complexity inevitably re-
quire a system of values and a list of priori-
ties. Legal questions are in their essence
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manifestations of value clashes within our
society itself. Only infrequently do legisla-
tors resolve these clashes comprehensively.
The legislative process requires that the dif-
ferent interests be reconciled and that a law
regulating an area of human conduct be ex-
pressed in terms which reflect a consensus
required for its enactment. But the Court
cannot stop when it has found the law's
area of common agreement; it must judge
the issue which has been presented to it.
And the mere fact that the issue has reached
the Supreme Court is some evidence that
the statute gives only equivocal answers.
A failure to realize what the Court is
called upon to do leads to frustration and
annoyance. The innocent observer can only
explain judicial disagreement, as Holmes
put it, "as if it meant simply that one side
or the other were not doing their sums
right, and if they would take more trouble,
agreement inevitably would come."
Depending on whether one agrees or dis-
agrees with the decision, the Court is, in
this simple view, either a society of god-
like creatures, or a club of nodding mortals.
Yet even those who have a sophisticated
understanding of the vital elements of ju-
dicial decision sometimes close their eyes
to the structure of our American legal sys-
tem. The Court is not merely a sounding
board for debate on the burning questions
of the day; it is a terminal point. The
prevailing doctrine under which we live en-
compasses an independent and supreme
judiciary which guards the sacred fires of the
Constitution, and regulates and resolves the
justiciable tensions. The alternatives to this
system (and-this fact bears periodic repeti-
tion) are anarchy or tyranny.
The Supreme Court is a consequence of
the need for an impartial and a detached
evaluation of governmental activity in the
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perspective of the Constitution. If the na-
tion acts in haste, it has a Court to prevent
an extended repentance. But, additionally,
the Court serves the real need of bringing
issues to a conclusion. However it may gall
us at the time, "the buck stops here."
A distinguishing mark of our legal sys-
tem is the precedence of process over
power. The Court may make a decision,
but its enforcement lies basically in a will-
ingness of the people to give that respect
which is due the system itself. This respect
does not hinge on agreement with any in-
dividual mandate of the Court, but on the
knowledge that problems must be resolved
by law.
The carping which overlooks the nature
of the judicial process, or which balks at
the meaning of the system, is dangerous
precisely because it tends to destroy and
not to improve law. No one would seri-
ously preach the heresy that the Court is
above criticism. The current problem is
quite to the contrary. Many of those who
have attacked the Court in past months
have actually forestalled effective criticism.
As one lawyer put it, "I wish some of these
people would shut up so that I could take
issue with some of the Court's opinions.
But I don't want people thinking that I'm
in agreement with the rash charges that
have been made."
The charge that the Court is playing a
creative role, rather than a mechanical one,
is noteworthy only for its naivet6. Those
who think that disagreements can be elimi-
nated by requiring the justices to have a
given amount of lower court experience are
only deceiving themselves. They cannot see
what Justice Frankfurter means when he
writes: "One is entitled to say without quali-
fication that the correlation between prior
judicial experience and fitness for the func-
tions of the Supreme Court is zero." And
why is this true? Because, he tells us,
the Court's preoccupation today is with the
application of rather fundamental aspira-
tions and what Judge Learned Hand calls
'moods,' embodied in provisions like the due
process clauses, which are deliberately de-
signed to supply only general norms of
decision. The judicial process in applying
them involves a judgment on the processes
of government. The Court sits in judgment,
that is, on the views of the direct representa-
tives of the people in meeting the needs of
society, on the views of Presidents and
Governors, and by their construction of
the will of the legislatures the Court
breathes life, feeble or strong, into the inert
pages of the Constitution and the statute
books.
Similarly naive is the mock horror with
which other critics of the Court contem-
plate the immense power which the justices
wield. Among the crass remedies which
some disgruntled critics would apply is a
periodic reconfirmation of the justices by
the Senate. Thinking the bath water foul,
they are momentarily not concerned that
the baby will be dumped out as well. At
bottom their complaint is not that there is
a Supreme Court but that the present Court
does not reflect their views.
To be effective, the critic of the Court
must appreciate the complex processes of
human judgment; he must also concede the
imperative need for finality in resolving
vexatious problems.
There is no guarantee that the values
which the judges apply are the proper ones.
Every decision, then, should come under
the closest scrutiny. Nor is there harm when
decisions are taken to another (for exam-
ple, the Congressional) arena. But criti-
cism must have direction, or it will be
worse than futile. It will be simply destruc-
tive.
